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Case Study 
 
The Sustainable and Green Engine (SAGE) – Aircraft Engine of the Future? 
 
Abstract 
The case of the EU’s Clean Sky initiative and its sustainable and green engine programme 
(SAGE) focuses on a sector where the implications of climate change are likely to be keenly felt 
in the coming decades, namely air transport. It is a sector where to date there have been few 
green or eco innovations. The case focuses on a current EU funded initiative designed to limit 
the impact of air transport on climate change. The initiative aims to foster innovation through 
the introduction of open rotor technology to power the next generation of short/medium haul 
airliners. This technology could potentially cut CO2 emissions from commercial aircraft by 100 
million tonnes per year (Nuttall, 2011). However it may also prove to be a disruptive technology 
rendering existing aircraft and possibly some of the firms that produce them, obsolete. As well as 
introducing some of the features of disruptive technologies the case highlights both the drivers 
for and barriers to the successful adoption of green innovations. Another important aspect of the 
case is that it also highlights the value of appropriate business strategies, such as the use of 
technology demonstrator programmes, in supporting and facilitating the adoption and diffusion 
of green innovations.  
 
Keywords: Green innovation, climate change, architectural innovation, disruptive technology, 
technology demonstrator, air transport,  
 
Introduction 
The last half century has witnessed unprecedented growth in air travel around the world. There 
are currently some 1,400 airline companies operating a total of 25,000 commercial passenger 
aircraft (Belobaba et al., 2016).  In 2013 the world’s airlines provided some 36 million flights 
and transported a total of 3.1 billion passengers. Indeed the airline industry now provides a 
service to virtually every country on earth. At the same time the industry has played an integral 
role in globalization and the creation of the global economy (Belobaba et al., 2016).  
 
However commercial airliners operated by the world’s airlines contribute to climate change 
through their emissions, of which the most significant is carbon dioxide (CO2), a conservative 
3 
 
gas that persists in the atmosphere over a long period (Daley, 2012). Perhaps surprisingly given 
its scale today, air transport has hitherto been a comparatively modest contributor to climate 
change. Emissions from all forms of transport comprise about 23 per cent of total emissions 
(Rhoades, 2014),  and global aviation emissions amount to about 12 per cent of this, or three per 
cent of the overall level of emissions (Palmer, 2015). This goes some way to explain why 
aviation emissions were not included in the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Lately the perception that aviation missions are relatively modest has begun to change. In part 
this is because of the increased credibility given to climate change generally, but it also reflects 
the continued growth of air transport. Since the start of the jet age in the 1960s, air travel has 
increased dramatically, almost trebling (Vasigh et al. (2013) in the last 20 years (see figure1). 
This growth has outpaced any specific reductions in emissions that have been achieved through 
technological advances. The latter have been significant. Over the course of several decades 
there have been substantial improvements in the fuel efficiency of commercial airliners. The 
amount of fuel used per mile travelled has dropped by 60% in the last 35 years, and this has been 
accompanied by lower emissions (Daley, 2012).  Most of the improvement has come from 
advances in engine technology, in particular the use of higher bypass ratios (BPRs) on turbofan 
engines that have been the product of advances in fan technology associated with new materials 
and improved aerodynamics.  
 
************ 
Insert Figure 1 
************ 
 
After six decades of advances however, gas turbine technology is now relatively mature. 
Consequently projections for the next 15 years anticipate improvements in fuel consumption to 
be more modest, and are estimated at no more than one per cent per year (Marais and Waitz, 
2016). At the same time commercial market forecasts indicate that sustained growth in air 
transport of five per cent per year will continue until 2030 (Airbus, 2007; Boeing, 2008). At this 
rate air transport can be expected to double every 15 years, leading to a sixfold increase by the 
middle of the century (Palmer, 2015). Given the projected sustained rapid growth of the air 
transport industry, aircraft emissions are expected to constitute a significant proportion of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (Daley, 2012), since emission reductions, assuming turbofan 
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engines continue to be used, are unlikely to be sufficient to offset the continued growth in air 
travel. Thus while at present CO2 emissions from commercial aircraft account for about three per 
cent of total emissions, this proportion is expected to rise by a predicted five per cent per year 
between now and 2020. Growth on this scale is rapidly transforming aviation from its position as 
‘a relatively minor polluter’ (Daley, 2012: 47) into a significant source of greenhouse gas 
emissions and in turn climate change. 
 
  
The Clean Sky Joint Technology Initiative 
Given mounting concern about the prospect of rapidly rising levels of emissions from aviation, 
the European Commission (EC) set up the ‘Clean Sky’ Joint Technology initiative (Kirby, 2012). 
This was launched in Brussels in February 2008. This is a large scale EU wide research 
programme involving a total of 86 organisations from 16 countries. With a budget of €1.6 
billion, Clean Sky is the most ambitious aeronautical research programme ever launched in 
Europe. Its aim is to develop breakthrough technologies that will significantly improve the 
environmental performance of commercial air transport in the future (SBAC, 2013), through the 
development of more environmentally friendly aircraft, that are not only quieter but offer 
significantly lower levels of emissions. 
 
In all Clean Sky comprises six programmes, covering both different categories of commercial 
aircraft and propulsion systems. One of these programmes is targeted at engine technologies. 
This is the Sustainable and Green Engine programme known as SAGE. The SAGE programme 
calls for the development of a number of technology demonstrator1 aero engines covering a 
range of applications. These include commercial airliners, regional aircraft and rotorcraft (i.e. 
helicopters). SAGE comprises six technology demonstrator programmes overall covering five 
different types of engine distinguished by application (e.g. narrow body) and engine architecture 
(e.g. three shaft). The five are : 
 
 Large 3 shaft turbofan 
 Lean burn 
 Turboshaft 
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 Geared turbofan 
 Open rotor 
 
Each draws on the competences and facilities of the major European aero engine manufacturers 
including Britain’s Rolls-Royce, France’s Snecma and Germany’s MTU.  
 
There is a focus within SAGE on innovative product architectures, in particular ones that offer 
opportunities for step-change reductions in CO2 emissions, relative to the current generation of 
turbofan engines powering narrow body and regional aircraft like the Airbus A320 and the 
Boeing 737. The two most innovative architectures being employed in SAGE are to be found on 
the geared turbofan (GTF) and open rotor engines. 
 
MTU of Germany is leading SAGE’s geared turbofan (GTF) technology demonstrator engine 
programme. It is based on an already certified engine, Pratt & Whitney’s PW1100G geared fan 
which is just entering service on the Airbus A320NEO aircraft family (A319NEO, A320NEO, 
A321NEO).  
 
The geared fan engine features a reduction gearbox located between the fan at the front of the 
engine and the low pressure turbine that drives it. On a conventional turbofan engine the two are 
directly connect via a shaft. With the addition of a gearbox, the conventional turbofan engine 
becomes a geared fan engine. The gearbox spins the fan at a much slower speed than the low 
pressure turbine. The ratio is about 3:1. This allows both sections of the engine to run at their 
optimum. Although the inclusion of a gearbox produces a weight penalty, the overall result is a 
much more efficient engine giving lower fuel consumption and lower emissions. The Pratt and 
Whitney PW1100G engine is expected to be 11per cent more fuel efficient than the engines it 
replaces. 
 
Developments being carried out as part of SAGE involve principally the high pressure 
compressor and the low pressure turbine modules. They are designed to improve relevant 
technologies in order to significantly reduce fuel burn and therefore emissions still further. They 
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will be incorporated into the next generation PW1100G geared fan engine which is slated to 
enter service in 2022-25. 
 
Open Rotor Technology 
While the GTF demonstrator can be integrated into an existing, albeit relatively new and as yet 
unproven engine design, the open rotor or propfan as it is sometimes termed, provides for a 
completely different engine architecture. As such it is much the most ambitious of the SAGE 
technology demonstrator projects. It represents a potential step-change for commercial aviation, 
because it offers the prospect of a reduction in fuel burn and thence emissions of as much as 40 
or even 50 per cent compared to current aircraft (Gunston, 2006). A performance improvement 
of this magnitude means that the open rotor concept is potentially an example of what 
Christensen (1997) terms a disruptive technology. Disruptive technologies re-define a product’s 
performance trajectory rendering existing technologies obsolete, often leading to the demise of 
some of the leading firms in the field. These are typically technologies with different attributes 
compared to existing mainstream products so that they are initially only of value in niche 
markets, but as the technology develops its performance even on mainstream attributes improves 
to the point where it displaces existing technologies. If existing firms don’t fully embrace the 
disruptive technology there is a very real prospect that they will exit the industry.  
 
 The advent of the ‘jet age’ in the 1960s with the introduction of the jet engine into civil aviation 
for example, led to the exit of one of the leading aero engine manufacturers, Wright, because the 
firm was very slow to develop a  jet engine preferring to stick with making increasingly 
sophisticated piston engines. The same thing happened to the leading manufacturer of piston 
engined commercial airliners, the California based firm of Douglas. Meanwhile a new entrant to 
commercial aviation, Boeing, flourished and ultimately came to dominate the industry, that is 
until wide-bodied jets came on to the scene when another new entrant, Airbus Industrie, 
appeared. 
 
Over the years engine manufacturers have improved the fuel burn of conventional turbofan 
engines by steadily increasing the bypass ratio (BPR), that is the proportion of cold air volume 
driven rearward by the engine’s fan in relation to the volume of hot gases coming from the core 
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(i.e. inside the engine). In effect this has meant increasing the size of the fan fitted at the front of 
the engine and the amount of air ducted around the engine thereby increasing the engine’s 
propulsive efficiency. Consequently as much as 70 per cent of the power of a turbofan engine 
comes not from the jet but from the fan at the front. The impact of this is very apparent when jets 
from the 1970s are compared with their modern counterparts like the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. 
Whereas the former have engines that are long and thin, the latter are equipped with engines that 
are much broader and more bulbous. General Electric’s biggest engine the GE90 has a diameter 
that is greater than the diameter of the fuselage of a Boeing 737. However there are limits to how 
much the BPR of an engine can be increased in this way. On a conventional (i.e. unducted) 
turbofan engine beyond a certain fan diameter the benefits of a higher BPR in terms of fuel 
consumption will eventually be more than offset by the increased weight and drag of the larger 
diameter nacelle required to house the fan (Dubois, 2014). Hence the challenge for engine 
manufacturers is to find technology solutions that will facilitate the use of higher BPR 
architectures without inducing fuel burn penalties (Dron, 2008).  
 
One way round this is to employ a radically different engine architecture (i.e. an architectural 
innovation). An open rotor is a concept that employs just such an architecture. Based on the same 
principles as a modern turbofan engine, an open rotor engine is essentially an engine without the 
ducting (i.e. the fan containment casing) fitted around the outside of the fan.  Instead the fan, in 
the form of a multi-bladed rotor or propeller, is mounted on the outside of the engine (see figure 
2). Using an open rotor in this way means its diameter is not constrained. The increased diameter 
of the rotor permits a very much higher BPR that allows the engine to work with a larger airflow 
regardless of aircraft speed and this in turn means that the energy turning the fan will be utilized 
more efficiently (Hallam, 2009). Combined with the removal of the heavy drag-inducing nacelle 
this means the fuel burn and hence the CO2  emissions of an open rotor design will be 
significantly less than that of an equivalent high BPR turbofan engine. Along with other 
technological advances associated with new materials and advanced aerodynamics, the gains in 
terms of reduced emissions (and fuel consumption) become very significant. 
 
************ 
Insert Figure 2 
************ 
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Early Attempts 
The open rotor is actually not a new concept. In the 1980s when fuel prices rose dramatically 
both of the leading American engine manufacturers experimented with open rotor engines. 
General Electric’s open rotor engine was developed as part of a NASA funded demonstrator 
programme that aimed to develop more fuel efficient engines. Termed the Unducted Fan (UDF), 
the GE36 engine was based on the core of an existing engine, the F404 that powered the 
McDonnell-Douglas F-18 Hornet fighter, and featured two rows of eight contra-rotating 
scimitar-like rotor blades 12 feet in diameter, mounted on the outside of the engine in a ‘pusher’ 
configuration.. Each individual blade was about five feet in length and made of carbon fibre 
composite, making them both extremely light and strong (Garvin, 1998).  
 
Unveiled at the Paris Air Show in 1985 (Sweetman, 2005), the GE36 engine offered enormous 
potential but presented equally large risks. It flew for the first time a year later in 1986 and 
caused a stir when a McDonnell-Douglas MD-80 airliner powered by the revolutionary engine 
was flown in front of the crowds at the Farnborough Air Show in 19882. It demonstrated 
outstanding fuel efficiency. However noise levels were problematic. Similarly there were safety 
issues over the danger of blades breaking free and damaging the fuselage. Despite this, Boeing 
announced plans to develop a new airliner, the Boeing 7J7 powered by the revolutionary new 
engine. By then the price of oil had fallen back significantly and airlines were lukewarm about 
the scale of the investment they would have to make in the new technology. Instead they 
preferred a much improved conventional turbofan, the CFM 56 developed jointly by General 
Electric and Snecma,,and as sales of this engine took off, the UDF engine was quietly dropped, 
although the carbon fibre blades were utilized in the GE90 engine that went on to power the 
Boeing 777. 
 
SAGE’s contra-rotating open rotor (CROR) engine 
Thirty years ago aviation emissions really weren’t an issue. However today with growing 
urgency regarding climate change and especially predictions about the future growth of 
commercial aviation, things have changed dramatically. Engine designers are now looking again 
at the possibilities offered by the concept of an open rotor engine in terms of delivering a 
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breakthrough not just in fuel burn, but more importantly by delivering radically improved 
environmental performance through reduced emissions of CO2. 
 
Consequently, as noted earlier the open rotor concept is making a comeback. It is one of five 
engine types currently being developed and evaluated as part of the EU’s Clean Sky’s 
sustainable green engine (SAGE) programme. Taking the lead is the French engine 
manufacturer, Snecma, working in collaboration with Airbus. As part of the programme 
designated SAGE 2  under Clean Sky, the Geared Open Rotor Demonstrator project is evaluating 
the feasibility and the environmental benefits of an open rotor propulsion system.  According to 
Vincent Garnier, Snecma’s director of product strategy and marketing (Dubois, 2014), the 
technology demonstrator programme they are leading as part of Clean Sky has three main goals: 
 
 to evaluate and validate the open rotor architecture 
 to push the science and technology of all the main components of the propulsion system 
 to build a team of partners 
 
The open rotor architecture being evaluated is similar to that employed by General Electric 
during the 1980s. However since then material science has made many advances and among the 
new technologies now being evaluated is a ceramic-matrix composite (CMC) used for airfoils in 
the low pressure (LP) turbine. CMC produces airfoils that are 70 per cent lighter than 
conventional airfoils and yield a lighter disk overall (Dubois, 2014). A feature of technology 
demonstrator programmes is that they provide an opportunity for firms to work together as 
partners on  a project. To date the partners in this particular SAGE programme include Italy’s 
Avio Aero, Britain’s GKN Aerospace and France’s Aircelle (part of Safran) along with Snecma 
(Eshel, 2014) the firm leading the project. Each of these partners is a specialist in its field. For 
example Avio Aero specializes in gearboxes, while GKN Aerospace which is providing the 
majority of the engine’s rotating module (Reals, 2016) which includes the rotors themselves, 
specializes in composite aerostructures including things like helicopter blades. 
 
The technology demonstrator programme began with Snecma testing a one fifth scale model of a 
contra-rotating open rotor (CROR) design. These tests were carried out at the French research 
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agency ONERA’s  SM1A wind tunnel at its research facility in Modane in the French Alps 
starting in 2010. They confirmed the open rotor’s efficiency (Warwick, 2014) and that a 2030 
timeframe for the introduction of open rotor engines into airline service was technically feasible.  
The aerodynamic performance of the open rotor design also featured in the wind tunnel tests. 
Three generations of blade design, HERA 1,3 and 5, were evaluated in terms of their 
aerodynamic performance (Warwick, 2014). Test results indicated that in aerodynamic terms an 
open rotor had the potential for a saving of around 30 per cent in terms of fuel used over 
comparable turbofan engines (Gubisch, 2014). 
 
Having successfully completed tests with a scale model, the next stage of the SAGE 2 
programme was for Snecma and its partners to construct a full size prototype engine employing 
an open rotor architecture. Like the earlier General Electric design, this experimental powerplant 
has two unducted contra-rotating rotors in a ‘pusher’ configuration at the rear of the engine. This 
configuration permits the installation of the engine at the rear of the aircraft, a location that 
shields the open rotors to reduce noise levels (Warwick, 2014). The advantage of having not one 
but two rotors and allowing them to contra-rotate is that the rotational component of the velocity 
of the air leaving the first set of blades (known as the ‘swirl’) will be corrected by the second set 
of blades and so increase the engine’s effective thrust (Dron, 2008). It also means that a contra-
rotating open rotor (CROR) engine can have smaller blades, which offer the benefit of easier 
integration with the airframe (SBAC, 2012).  
 
The engine itself is based on the core of Snecma’s M88 engine which powers the Dassault Rafale 
fighter (Gubisch, 2012). Unlike General Electric’s earlier UDF engine, where a direct drive from 
the turbine was used to power the rotors, the SAGE 2 demonstrator employs a gearbox to 
optimize rotational speeds. The contra-rotating pusher with a power gearbox concept is actually 
slightly lighter than General Electric’s UDF engine, because it permits a significant reduction in 
the number of power turbine stages (Dron, 2008). It is also less noisy thanks to a reduction in the 
speed of the rotor blades. Like the earlier UDF engine, the SAGE 2 demonstrator features 
variable pitch technology to control the rotor blades themselves.  
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Construction of the full size demonstrator engine was virtual complete by mid- 2016, with the 
first run due to take place later in the year (Reals, 2016). This will be followed by an extensive 
period of ground testing at Snecma’s engine test facility in France. This will not only enable 
engineers to evaluate the engine’s performance it will also be an opportunity to trial variations 
both in the design and the materials used. This is likely to last at least two years and is scheduled 
to be carried out on the aft fuselage of an Airbus A340-300. Flight testing will focus on airframe 
integration and certification issues (Warwick, 2014). Only when the technical and economic 
viability of the open rotor design has been firmly established through the SAGE 2 demonstrator 
will work start on the production stage to build a fully commercial open rotor engine. This 
unlikely to be until 2025, with entry into service taking place after 2030. The production stage 
will be particularly challenging due to the complexity of the engine’s rear assembly comprising 
as it does a gearbox and a variable pitch system for the rotor blades.  
 
Applications 
One weak point of open rotor designs is that they are less suited to long haul wide-bodied aircraft 
like the Boeing 777 and 787. This arises because the BPR is an important parameter for an 
aircraft’s climb capability. On long haul flights this is a relatively short flight phase, with aircraft 
spending a much greater proportion of the flight in the cruise phase. On short and medium haul 
flights in contrast the aircraft spends a much greater proportion of flight time in the climb phase 
(Dubois, 2014). As a result there is a much bigger gain from a high BPR on short and medium 
haul flights. This is why Pratt & Whitney’s new geared turbofan (GTF) engine the PW1100G, 
which has a relatively high BPR of 12:1, is fitted to Airbus’s new short haul airliner, the narrow 
body, single aisle A320NEO.  
 
Consequently short and medium haul aircraft are the ones that are most likely to utilize open 
rotor technology if the outcome of this demonstrator programme is successful. Fortunately this 
particular market niche is a significant one. The two main protagonists in this market are 
currently the Airbus A320 and the Boeing.737. These aircraft are each company’s best selling 
models (see table 1), with a combined output in 2015 of almost 1,000 aircraft. Hence if the 
technology demonstrator programme proves the technology, the market for an environmentally 
sound, low emission engine is potentially substantial. 
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*********** 
Insert Table 1 
*********** 
 
Challenges 
While there is a distinct market niche (i.e. short and medium haul aircraft) for an open rotor 
engine, nonetheless the concept presents considerable technological challenges. This provides 
much of the rationale behind the use of a technology demonstrator programme, since as Vincent 
Garnier, Snecma’s director of product strategy and marketing for civil engines noted at a recent 
conference (Warwick,2014), they provide, ‘a great learning vehicle’. The technological 
challenges extend to five main aspects of the open rotor design:- 
 
 noise 
 safety 
 airframe integration 
 maintenance 
 speed 
 
Noise was an issue on General Electric’s UDF engine back in the 1980s (Gubisch, 2014).Noise 
levels on an open rotor are higher because the rotating blades are open and not muffled by the 
fan case and the nacelle as they are on a turbofan engine. However solutions to this appear to be 
in sight. Using a ‘pusher’ configuration for the rotors with the engines mounted at the rear of the 
fuselage helps to mitigate the noise. In addition Snecma’s wind tunnel tests evaluated a number 
of aspects of open rotor designs in pursuit of noise reduction. These included: the optimum 
distance between the two sets of blades; the number of blades on each rotor; and the profile of 
the blades themselves. The results were sufficiently encouraging for Snecma to conclude that 
noise was not an insurmountable problem and that an open rotor would be able to meet 
appropriate noise regulations. 
 
Safety is problematic since certification requirements of bodies like the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) demand that in the event of a mechanical failure caused by a rotor burst or 
the release of a blade (Warwick, 2014), pieces from the engine must not be able to penetrate the 
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fuselage and threaten either the passengers themselves or the aircraft’s hydraulic systems. On 
turbofan engines this requirement is met by the fan case which surrounds the fan at the front of 
the engine. Such protection is clearly absent on an open rotor. Instead aircraft powered by open 
rotor engines will require the fitting of shielding. Airbus has estimated that this could add as 
much 1,100 lbs in additional weight (Warwick, 2014). However the use of lightweight carbon 
fibre composites is likely to offer a solution.  
 
Airframe integration is a potential problem because of the size of the rotor blades which would 
be too big to fit under the wing as on conventional jets at present. Mounting the engines at the 
rear of the  aircraft instead of under the wings as on most conventional airliners today, avoids 
this problem but will make maintenance more difficult. Thus as a recent report from the SBAC 
(2013) noted whichever mounting configuration is selected there will be issues surrounding 
integration with the airframe. 
 
Maintenance issues are not confined to engine location. Because the SAGE 2 engine utilizes both 
a reduction gearbox and variable pitch technology, it will require more maintenance as these are 
complex mechanical systems. This is particularly an issue when it comes to convincing airlines 
to make the switch to open rotor designs, as airlines that have used turboprop aircraft in the past 
will be aware of the higher maintenance requirements (compared to conventional turbofan 
engines) associated with these mechanical systems. Similarly there will also be issues 
surrounding maintenance. 
 
Finally it is worth noting that open rotor aircraft will be slightly slower than today’s jets. This is 
because while they are capable of travelling at Mach 0.8, for optimum efficiency they need to fly 
slightly slower at Mach 0.75. However since open rotors are intended for short haul applications 
the increase in flight times is likely to be minimal.  
 
Thus while an open rotor design like the SAGE 2 engine does present a number of significant 
technological challenges which will make the new product development process a lengthy one, 
none of them appears to be insurmountable. In addition given that it isn’t planned that open rotor 
powered aircraft should enter service until 2030 there is sufficient time for the technical issues to 
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be solved.  This, combined with the potential contribution to climate change mitigation through 
much reduced levels of emissions, is part of the rationale for the EU funding technology 
demonstrator projects like the sustainable and green engine (SAGE). 
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Note 
1. A technology demonstrator is a prototype of a new product incorporating new technologies 
and built as a proof of concept design, with the primary purpose of showcasing the feasibility, 
performance and possible applications of the new technology. They aim to demonstrate to 
potential investors, partners and potential customers the viability of the new technology. They 
are used in high tech sectors like aerospace where they are often publicly funded. 
 
2.  A video clip showing a demonstration flight of this aircraft powered by General Electric’s 
GE36 open rotor engine at Farnborough in 1988 is available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BMNaXc1rL8  
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TEACHING NOTE 
 
1. Synopsis 
According to Dogannis (2009) in the last 50 years technological innovations in air transport have 
far outstripped any other transport mode. Open rotor technology embodied in propfan engines 
like SAGE 2 potentially represents another important leap forward. However while this 
technology is highly attractive in terms of cutting emissions from commercial aircraft, the 
success of this green innovation is by no means certain. The case study provides an opportunity 
to explore some of the barriers and other factors that contribute to this uncertainty, while also 
exploring how initiatives such as technology demonstrators can help to convince potential 
customers (i.e. airlines) of the value of this technology, not just for those who are flying but for 
society as a whole. At the same time it provides scope for considering the possible impact of this 
new technology through the concept of disruptive technologies. A key feature of the case study is 
that it deals with a topic, air travel, which most students will have experienced and provides an 
opportunity to appreciate that green innovations, while they are clearly highly desirable in terms 
of creating a sustainable environment, often face complex issues when it comes to successful 
adoption and diffusion.  
 
2. Learning objectives 
The case study’s primary learning objectives for students are: 
a) Analyse the range of drivers that can induce green innovations. 
b) Evaluate the business strategies, such as demonstrator programmes and targeting of niche 
markets, that can help to facilitate the successful adoption and take-up of green 
innovations. 
c) Analyse the concept of a disruptive technology and be aware of both its potential impact 
and the factors that can lead to its acceptance or rejection in commercial markets. 
d) Assess the various barriers that can impede the successful introduction of green 
innovations. 
 
2. Suggested questions 
Q1: Identify and assess:  a.) the drivers and b.) the barriers to the successful introduction of 
green innovations in the field of air transport. 
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See Rennings (2000) and Smith (2015) for discussion of the drivers and barriers associated with 
green innovations.  
Drivers: According to Rennings (2000) there are potentially three types of driver for green 
innovations, namely technology push, market pull and regulatory push. It is likely that the 
drivers in this case will be a combination of regulatory push and technological push factors, 
although students might well want to discuss the possibility that market pull would also be a 
driver.   Perhaps surprisingly there is at present no real regulatory push in the sense that there are 
only limited requirements for the airlines or the manufacturers to reduce their emissions from 
aircraft. However significant changes are on the way. For example, the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the agency that oversees civil aviation, recently put forward the 
first efficiency standard for aircraft for the United Nations to approve (Reals (2016) in February 
2016. Given the rapidly rising level of emissions from aircraft and increasing concerns about 
climate change, further regulations covering aircraft emissions are likely. Certainly by 2030 one 
could expect to see regulations requiring significant reductions in emissions. There is also an 
element of technology push. This is associated with improvements in design, especially in the 
field of aerodynamics, which have led to improvements in fan blade design. (It can be useful to 
get students to look at modern passenger aircraft and compare them with those of the 1960s – fan 
blades look different and one rarely sees large amounts of smoke being produced on take-off 
today). The other technological change is in the area of new materials. The introduction of 
carbon fibre has permitted the development of much more efficient and safer fan blades. 
 
Barriers: These are likely to be technological, economic, and institutional.  As with most 
technological innovations one would expect the technological barriers to be the main ones. While 
these are undoubtedly important, and include aspects such as safety, noise and maintenance 
requirements, students should be encouraged to explore possible economic and institutional 
barriers. The economic barriers include the enormous cost of developing both new engines and 
new aircraft and the problem of ‘sunk costs’, such as the large sums airlines have invested in 
maintenance facilities for jet engines. However institutional barriers are also likely to be 
important (see Scott, 2013). The institutional barriers are likely to be ones associated with the 
structure of the airline industry. It is highly competitive and very cyclical. Consequently major 
investment decisions like switching to a new type of aircraft fitted with a new propulsion system 
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involve issues surrounding legitimacy and isomorphism. Airline managers may be very wary of 
new technologies, if they are different and not used by other airlines. Given its highly 
competitive nature there is likely to be a collective wariness within the industry about the 
legitimacy of committing massive resources to investing in a new technology. One might well 
see the airlines and others in the industry as ‘vested interests’. Having invested in the current 
technology for air travel they may be reluctant to write this off and invest in something new. The 
key thing is that students appreciate that innovations, especially green ones, are about much more 
than developing new technologies.  
 
Q2: What is an architectural innovation and is the concept relevant in this case? 
Essential reading for this question is the paper by Henderson and Clarke (1990) on architectural 
innovation (alternatively there is a summary in Smith (2015)). According to Henderson and 
Clarke (1990) the essence of an architectural innovation is that it involves the re-configuration of 
a system to link together existing components in a different way. That is pretty much what was 
has happened in the case of the SAGE 2 open rotor engine. The ‘core’ of the SAGE 2 is from an 
existing engine, similarly gearboxes and variable pitch systems are used on turboprop engines 
and the rotor blades are very like those now being used on the most advanced turbofans. What is 
different is the way they are configured. An open rotor engine has a different architecture and 
that’s what makes it an architectural innovation. This is a good opportunity to get students to 
think about the nature of innovation. Innovations aren’t just about new technologies. Design is 
also very important and an open rotor is a design that differs markedly from conventional 
turbofan engines.  
 
Q3: Why is it possible that the open rotor may prove to be an example of a disruptive 
technology? 
This is an opportunity to explore the concept of disruptive technologies in greater depth (see 
Christensen, 1997) and ensure that students thoroughly understand it by considering examples 
where a new technology has proved destructive in the past. According to Christensen (1997) a 
disruptive technology typically brings forward a different value proposition compared to an 
existing technology. Quite often this new value proposition or aspects of it will not be valued by 
most mainstream consumers. Thus the first jet airliners were faster and could fly much higher 
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than conventional airliners but were much more expensive to purchase and to operate. Initially 
this made them an unattractive proposition for most airlines, who assumed that higher operating 
costs would mean higher fares that would deter people from flying. But for some travellers, such 
as business people and celebrities, the benefits of a more comfortable flight and shorter journey 
times outweighed the additional cost. In time jet engines became more fuel efficient and jet 
travel began to appeal to mainstream customers. The technology proved disruptive because 
piston engined airliners (i.e. with propellers), like the Douglas DC7C and the Lockheed 
Constellation quickly became obsolete. As a result engine makers like Wright who were slow to 
adopt jet engine technology exited the industry.  
 
With the open rotor the new value proposition will be significantly lower emissions. At present 
this does not appear to be highly valued either by passengers or airlines. But in time this may 
well change. If emissions are much more tightly regulated either directly or through something 
like a carbon trading scheme, then this could well change dramatically and open rotor technology 
could come into its own. If it does then conventional jet powered airliners in use today will 
become obsolete. This in turn may lead to some existing makers of aircraft and engines going out 
of business, to be replaced by new entrants who are quicker at adopting open rotor technology.   
However students need to appreciate there is much uncertainty surrounding this and this makes 
decisions about developing and adopting such a technology particularly difficult.  
 
Q4: Identify and analyse the business strategies employed in this case to facilitate the successful 
adoption of green innovations. 
This is a great opportunity to get students to think about the adoption and diffusion of green 
innovations. To that end students should be directed to the classic text on innovation diffusion by 
Rogers (1995). Students need to appreciate that especially with green innovations its quite easy 
to sell an innovation to ‘early adopters’ those individuals and firms that are interested in and 
enthusiastic about sustainability and efforts to mitigate climate change. Persuading the rest of us 
is a more difficult task, especially where huge investments in time and money are concerned.  
 
Two business strategies that can help are technology demonstrator programmes and niche 
markets and these are both being used in this case. The SAGE 2 engine is a technology 
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demonstrator programme, where the European Union is putting up much of the money to enable 
a commercial enterprise, in this case the French engine manufacturer Snecma, to build a 
prototype open rotor engine. The value of this is that manufacturers can then trial new 
technologies, test their feasibility and collect valuable performance data through extensive 
testing of the prototype. At the same time technology demonstrators provide a valuable 
opportunity to showcase the new technology especially for potential customers, who in this case 
include both the airlines and the travelling public. They can then hopefully be convinced of the 
value of this green innovation. Students need to appreciate that building a prototype aero engine 
is enormously expensive, which is why bodies like the EU fund this kind of activity.  
 
Similarly niche markets can be a very effective way of introducing an innovation. A good 
example is the construction equipment manufacturer JCB, where they initially sold the first 
hydraulic excavators not to existing users of cable operated excavators such as mining 
companies, but to house builders and utility companies, who had always dug trenches by hand in 
the past. The latter were a specific group (i.e. niche) that valued the flexibility and mobility of 
the new hydraulic excavators whereas existing customers did not. So too with propfan engines 
using open rotors where the market niche is short haul aircraft where the gain will be greatest.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The SAGE 2 project is on-going. By mid-2016 Snecma was reporting that most of the 
manufacturing of the technology demonstrator had been carried out and it, along with its partners 
was at the engine assembly stage. Ground testing of the engine was due to start towards the end 
of 2016. Flight testing on an Airbus A340 isn’t due to start until 2019. A key feature of ground 
testing will be validating the mechanical integrity of the powerplant and identifying potential 
applications (i.e. the types of aircraft for which it would be suitable). Open rotor engines are 
expected to enter commercial service by 2030-35, but this will be dependent on the development 
of an all-new airframe which according to Henrick Runnemalm, director of advanced 
engineering at GKN Aerospace (Reals, 2016), is likely to be a smaller, short range regional 
airliner. It will also be dependent on oil prices rising from their current low levels and persuading 
airline managers that passengers will accept a return to aircraft with propellers – albeit of a very 
different design! 
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Figure 1 
The Growth of Air Transport in Passenger Numbers 1970-2005 
 
 
 
Source: Daley (2012) 
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Figure 2 
Contra-Rotating Open Rotor Pusher configurations 
 
 
 
 
Source: Guynn et al. (2011) 
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Table 1 
Orders and output of Airbus and Boeing aircraft 2014-15 
 
 
Airbus  
short/medium haul (single aisle) 
2014 2015 
Orders Deliveries Orders Deliveries 
A320 1321 490 897 491 
Long haul (twin aisle)     
A330 154 108 140 103 
A350 -32 1 -3 14 
A380 13 30 2 27 
Total 1456 629 1036 635 
     
Boeing     
Short/medium haul (single aisle)     
737 1104 485 588 495 
Long haul (twin aisle)     
747 0 19 2 18 
767 4 6 49 16 
777 283 99 58 98 
787 41 114 71 135 
Total 1432 723 768 762 
Grand Total 2888 1352 1804 1397 
 
Source: Kingsley-Jones, M. (2016)  
 
 
